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How	'Democratic'	is	the	Democratic	Peace?	A	Survey	
Experiment	of	Foreign	Policy	Preferences	in	Brazil	and	China*	
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Erik	Gartzke2	https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9439-1310		 1Duke	University,	North	Carolina,	United	States	2University	of	California,	California,	United	States		Recent	 research	 has	 shown	 that	 British	 and	 American	respondents	are	less	willing	to	advocate	the	use	of	 force	against	fellow	democracies	 than	against	non-democracies	 (TOMZ	and	WEEKS,	2013).	These	 findings	 may	 contribute	 to	 understandings	 of	 the	 'democratic	bias'—unwillingness	 to	 attack	 democracies.	 A	 critical	 next	 step	 is	assessing	 whether	 publics	 beyond	 the	 US	 and	 the	 UK	 have	 similar	attitudes.	 To	 address	 the	 scope	 of	 popular	 preferences	 for	 peace	with	democracies,	we	conduct	survey	experiments	using	online	panels	in	two	emerging	powers,	 one	 a	democracy	 (Brazil)	 and	one	 a	non-democracy	(China).	 Our	 survey	 randomly	 varies	 the	 hypothetical	 target's	 regime	type	 and	 authorization	 by	 the	 United	 Nations	 for	 military	 action.	 We	find	 that	 Brazilian	 respondents	 are	 significantly	 less	 likely	 to	 support	the	use	of	 force	 against	 a	democracy	 than	a	non-democracy.	However,	after	controlling	for	UN	approval,	Chinese	respondents	do	not	appear	to	distinguish	 between	 democracies	 and	 non-democracies	 when	considering	whether	force	is	justified.	In	addition,	for	both	countries,	UN	approval	 has	 a	 larger	 effect	 than	democracy	 on	public	 support	 for	 the	use	of	force.	
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		 tudents	 of	 politics	 have	 devoted	 enormous	 attention	 to	 exploring	 the	role	that	domestic	publics	play	in	formulating	foreign	policy.	Evidence	of	 the	 impact	 of	 public	 opinion	 has	 been	 difficult	 to	 unearth,	 however.	 Given	difficulties	 with	 inference	 and	 identification,	 researchers	 have	 begun	 to	 apply	experimental	techniques	to	assist	in	better	understanding	relationships.	In	a	recent	example,	Tomz	and	Weeks	(2013)	demonstrate	experimentally	that	 subjects	 in	 the	 United	 States	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 are	 less	 willing	 to	advocate	 attacks	 against	 democracies	 than	 against	 non-democratic	 countries.	Popular	 preferences	 might	 thus	 account	 for	 the	 democratic	 peace	 —	 the	observation	that	democracies	seldom	fight	each	other.	Yet	 while	 experiments	 can	 establish	 strong	 causal	 linkages,	 ambiguity	persists	in	the	interpretation	of	results	and	in	connecting	individual-level	findings	to	 macro-level	 processes.	 It	 is	 not	 clear,	 for	 example,	 that	 asking	 citizens	 in	 a	democracy	whether	they	are	willing	to	go	to	war	with	another	democratic	country	necessarily	 implies	 that	 respondents	 in	a	non-democracy	will	behave	differently,	or	 that	 the	 populations	 in	 all	 democracies	 are	 equally	 reticent	 to	 make	 war	 on	other	democracies.	Much	remains	before	researchers	can	confidently	 tie	 findings	about	 a	 subject's	 stated	 preferences	 to	 patterns	 of	 conflict	 involving	 liberal	republics.	A	critical	step,	as	Tomz	and	Weeks	(2013)	point	out,	is	to	determine	the	generalizability	of	the	linkage	between	public	opinion,	regime	type,	and	war.	How	'democratic'	are	popular	preferences	for	peace	with	liberal	states?	To	answer	 this	 question,	 we	 conducted	 survey	 experiments	 involving	 subjects	 in	 two	emerging	powers,	China	and	Brazil.	The	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom	are	'exceptional'	 nations,	 possessing	 extraordinary	 wealth,	 power,	 social	 status	 and	with	closely	linked	histories	and	cultures.	The	foreign	policy	attitudes	of	citizens	in	these	two	English-speaking	democracies	might	prove	equally	exceptional.	The	two	countries	in	our	survey	were	chosen	with	considerable	care.	Each	nation	 is	 a	 rising	 regional	 power,	 capable	 of	 acting	 aggressively	 if	 it	 so	 chooses.	Using	 military	 force	 is	 thus	 more	 than	 a	 mere	 abstraction	 for	 publics	 in	 either	country.	 Each	 nation's	 interests	 are	 also	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 global	 status	 quo;	questions	about	the	use	of	force	are	unlikely	to	be	confused	in	the	public	mind	with	hegemonic	leadership	or	acting	'as	the	world's	policeman'.	
S	
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Brazil	 is	 a	 young	democracy,	 exhibiting	key	differences	 from	established	leading	nations.	As	 in	many	younger	democracies,	 support	 for	democracy	 is	not	strong	as	in	the	United	States	or	Western	Europe;	in	some	surveys,	fewer	than	half	 of	 respondents	 identify	democracy	 as	 the	best	 form	of	 government.	 Popular	enthusiasm	for	cooperating	with	other	democracies	may	be	affected	by	the	degree	to	which	democracy	is	consolidated	domestically.	China	 is	 a	 non-democracy.	 The	 democratic	 peace	 is	 defined	 by	 critical	differences	 in	 the	 foreign	 policy	 behaviors	 of	 democratic	 and	 non-democratic	states.	 It	 is	 thus	 essential	 to	 examine	 the	 determinants	 of	 foreign	 policy	 in	 both	types	of	 regimes.	 If	public	opinion	has	an	 impact	on	 the	use	of	 force	by	regimes,	then	we	must	examine	opinion	in	both	types	of	systems.	Of	course,	it	may	well	be	that	public	preferences	have	less	impact	on	foreign	policy	in	authoritarian	than	in	non-authoritarian	countries.	But	this	would	imply	an	interaction	between	institutions	and	public	 opinion	 as	 the	 causal	mechanism	 that	 explains	 the	democratic	 peace.	Either	way,	a	 critical	 first	 step	 is	empirical	—	examining	public	attitudes	 toward	democracies	 in	 both	 democratic	 and	 non-democratic	 regimes.	 These	 cases	 thus	offer	important	variation	in	regime	type,	development,	status	and	culture	needed	to	evaluate	the	generality	of	the	link	between	public	opinion	and	democratic	peace.	A	 second	 concern	has	 to	 do	with	meaning.	 Publics	may	 imbue	 the	word	'democracy'	with	content	that	researchers	 ignore	at	 their	peril.	 It	 is	possible	that	subjects	 interpret	 democracy,	 not	 as	 a	 set	 of	 political	 institutions	 and	 norms	 as	understood	by	academic	researchers,	but	as	coded	language	for	a	'good',	'friendly'	or	'responsible'	country.	To	find	out,	we	included	a	second	experimental	variable	in	our	survey.	Subjects	were	randomly	informed	that	the	United	Nations	had,	or	had	not,	authorized	 using	 force	 against	 a	 target	 nation.	 While	 only	 an	 initial	 step	 in	determining	how	subjects	perceive	democracy,	the	treatment	addresses	concerns	that	democracy	may	be	interpreted	by	subjects	as	an	authoritative	cue	indicating	quality	or	virtue.	As	 it	 turns	 out,	 the	 public	 preference	 for	 peace	 with	 democracies	 is	widespread	but	context	dependent.	Respondents	from	both	Brazil	and	China	were	generally	 less	 likely	 to	 endorse	 military	 violence	 against	 a	 state	 when	 it	 was	randomly	identified	as	a	democracy	in	our	experiment.	At	the	same	time,	however,	
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United	Nations	authorization	—	or	a	lack	thereof	—	proved	much	more	important	in	predicting	public	preferences	for	using	force.	After	 reviewing	 relevant	 literatures,	 we	 detail	 the	 benefits	 of	 a	 broader	assessment	 of	 the	 connection	 between	 public	 opinion	 and	 the	 democratic	peace,	across	cultures,	 regime	type	and	economic	development.	We	then	discuss	details	of	our	experimental	design	and	present	the	results	from	the	Brazilian	and	Chinese	 samples.	 We	 conclude	 by	 reviewing	 implications	 of	 our	 findings	 for	democratic	peace	theory.	
	
Literature:	democracy	and	peace	Democracies	 are	 much	 more	 peaceful	 with	 each	 other	 than	 are	 other	pairings	of	states,	though	democracies	are	about	as	war	prone	as	other	regimes	in	general	(RUSSETT	and	ONEAL,	2001)1.	This	implies	that	democratic	dyads	are	the	most	 cooperative,	 followed	 by	 non-democratic	 dyads,	 while	 mixed	 dyads	(democracy	 and	 non-democracy)	 are	 the	 most	 conflictual.	 Numerous	 studies	observe	or	document	a	significant	 reduction	 in	 conflict	 in	 democratic	 dyads	(e.g.	BABST,	1964;	DOYLE,	1997;	HUTH	and	ALLEE,	2003;	LEVY,	1988;	MAOZ	and	RUSSETT,	1993;	RUSSETT,	1993;	SMALL	and	SINGER,	1976)2.	Theorizing	 the	 democratic	 peace	 has	 proven	 to	 be	 a	 greater	 challenge.	Initial	explanations	focused	on	linkages	between	domestic	political	attributes	and	observed	 reductions	 in	 the	 use	 of	 force.	 Institutionalists	 argued	 that	representation,	 deliberation,	 and	 civilian	 bureaucracy	 inhibit	 military	 violence	(MESQUITA	and	LALMAN,	1992;	MAOZ	and	RUSSETT,	1993;	RUSSETT,	1993).	Kant	(1972)	saw	constitutional	constraints	as	restraining	the	sovereign's	innate	proclivity	to	make	war.	Normative	explanations	assign	an	analogous	role	to	democratic	culture	(DIXON,	 1994;	 MINTZ	 and	 GEVA,	 1993;	 OWEN,	 1997;	 RUSSETT,	 1993)3.	Constructivists	 claim	 that	 force	 in	 the	 international	 system	 is	 becoming	 socially	
______________________________________________________________________________________________	1Some	 debate	 over	 whether	 democracies	 are	 generally	 less	 warlike,	 though	 even	advocates	admit	that	this	is	a	weaker	relationship	(e.g.	ROUSSEAU	et	al.,	1996).	2Critics	of	 the	democratic	peace	challenge	 its	statistical	validity	(SPIRO,	1994),	or	generalizability	(HENDERSON,	2002).	Others	offer	alternatives,	 including	alliances	(GOWA,	1995),	 the	Cold	War	(GOWA,	1999),	or	satisfaction	(LEMKE	and	REED,	1996).	3Old	democratic	dyads	appear	as	dispute	prone	as	new	dyads	(WARD	and	GLEDITSCH,	1998).	
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unacceptable	(RISSE-KAPPEN,	1997;	WENDT,	1999).	Some	see	 the	evolution	of	a	common	 community	 or	 identity	 (DEUTSCH,	 1978;	 FLYNN	 and	 FARRELL,	 1999).	Others	 assert	 that	 mature	 democracies	 fail	 to	 fight	 states	 they	 perceive	 as	democratic	 (WEART,	 1998)4.	 Many	 authors	 have	 focused	 on	 the	 informational	aspect	of	democracies,	viewing	them	as	more	transparent	(e.g.	SMALL,	1996;	VAN	BELLE,	1997)	or	possibly	more	credible	due	to	the	'audience	costs'	or	opposition	groups	 that	 enable	 democracies	 to	 signal	 resolve	 (e.g.	 FEARON,	 1994;	 SCHULTZ,	1998,	1999;	SMITH,	1998)5.	However,	 constraint	 theories	 have	 been	 criticized	 as	 ad	 hoc	 and	deductively	 flawed	 (MESQUITA	 et	 al.,	 1999;	 ROSATO,	 2003).	Moreover,	 scholars	have	 noted	 that	 efforts	 to	 avoid	 circularity	 between	 theory	 and	 evidence	would	benefit	 most	 from	 new	 empirical	 content	 (HUTH	 and	 ALLEE,	 2003).	 Work	 by	Mousseau	 (2000)	 and	Hegre	 (2000),	 for	 example,	 limits	 the	democratic	peace	 to	advanced	industrial	economies.	It	is	not	obvious	why	norms,	institutions,	or	other	factors	would	 inhibit	 conflict	 among	 rich	 democracies	 but	 fail	 to	 do	 so	 for	 poor	democratic	states.	Recent	 efforts	 seek	 to	 apply	 public	 opinion	 research	 to	 the	 democratic	peace,	attributing	the	democratic	peace	to	publics'	preferences	(e.g.	DAFOE	et	al.,	2015;	 LACINA	 and	 LEE,	 2013)6.	 For	 instance,	 Tomz	 and	Weeks	 (2013)	 report	 a	survey	 experiment	 of	 public	 attitudes	 toward	military	 violence	 among	 US	and	British	citizens.	Subjects	were	asked	to	consider	whether	or	not	their	country	should	use	force	in	a	hypothetical	international	crisis.	The	study	finds	a	consistent	treatment	effect	for	democracy;	subjects	are	significantly	less	likely	to	support	attacks	against	 a	 democracy.	 In	 a	 follow-up	 study,	 Tomz	 and	 Weeks	 (2018)	 find	 that	normative	 concerns	 separable	 from	 democracy	 matter	 much	 more	 than	 regime	type	 in	 explaining	 popular	 opinion	 concerning	 the	 use	 of	 force.	 Their	 survey	experiment,	again	using	samples	from	the	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom,	
______________________________________________________________________________________________	4Liberal	 leaders	 or	 voters	 may	 potentially	 downplay	 the	 'democraticness'	 of	 enemy	 regimes	 in	order	to	allow	themselves	to	pursue	Realpolitik	with	fewer	normative	concerns	(OREN,	1995).	5C.f.	Scholars	have	noted	that	 the	original	audience	cost	 theory	 is	"silent	on	whether	democracies	are	more	or	less	able	to	commit	credibly	during	a	crisis"	(SLANTCHEV,	2012,	p.	378).	6See	Hyde	(2015)	for	a	review	of	experimental	works	on	International	Relations,	including	those	on	audience	costs.	
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shows	 that	 the	 pacifying	 effect	 of	 a	 treatment	 for	 whether	 the	 target	 country	supports	human	rights	subsumes	the	effect	of	the	treatment	for	democracy.	Evidence	 that	 citizens	 care	more	 about	whether	 a	 hypothetical	 target	 is	humanistic	 than	 democratic	 suggests	 a	 role	 for	 social	 affinity.	 Common	preferences	 or	values	may	be	a	key	contributor	 to	democratic	peace	 (GARTZKE,	1998,	 2000;	 HUTH	 and	 ALLE,	 2003).	 The	 term	 'democracy'	 may	 also	 have	important	socially	constructed	connotations	for	respondents,	reflecting	subjective	normative	'goods'	in	addition	to	a	nation's	actual	political	attributes.	The	 notion	 that	 democratic	 peace	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 elite	 or	 popular	affinities	 is	also	attractive	because	 it	 is	uncomplicated	(FARBER	and	GOWA,	1997).	 If	democratic	 citizens	or	 their	 leaders	 'like'	 each	other,	 then	 this	 could	account	for	 the	 democratic	 peace	 observation,	 without	 requiring	 an	 elaborate	 theory	 to	generate	the	special	dyadic	nature	of	the	relationship.	However,	the	risk	in	such	an	explanation	is	that	it	again	tends	toward	tautology,	given	that	the	absence	of	war	among	 societies	 is	 an	 important	 indication	 of	 affinity.	 The	 proper	 way	 forward,	then,	 is	 to	 assess	 cases	 where	 affinities	 are	 not	 inherent	 or	 obvious.	 If	 the	democratic	peace	works	by	making	democracies	more	friendly	toward	one	another,	then	capable	revisionist	democracies	(such	as	Brazil)	confronting	a	world	dominated	by	capable	 democratic	 powers	 should	 behave	 differently	 from	 capable	 revisionist	autocracies	 (such	 as	 China)	 confronting	 this	 same	world	 of	 powerful	 status	 quo	democracies.		
	
Theory:	public	opinion	and	the	democratic	peace	The	democratic	peace	 is	 an	observation	about	how	pairs	of	democracies	differ	 in	 their	 foreign	 policies	 from	 other	 combinations	 of	 states.	 It	 follows	 that	explaining	 the	democratic	peace	most	 likely	 involves	 identifying	differences	between	 democracies	 and	 non-democracies.	 If	 public	 opinion	 differs	systematically	 between	 citizens	 in	 democracies	 and	 non-democracies,	 then	 this	would	be	evidence	that	public	attitudes	may	be	critical	to	the	democratic	peace.		More	 generally,	while	 'micro'	 evidence	 of	 a	 link	 between	 public	 opinion	and	a	preference	for	peace	toward	democracies	—	at	least	in	some	countries	—	is	provocative	and	interesting,	questions	remain	about	how	to	tie	this	finding	to	the	
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'macro'	 evidence	 typically	 associated	 with	 the	 dyadic	 democratic	 peace	observation.	The	democratic	peace	is	a	global	phenomenon	best	suited	to	evidence	that	 the	 impact	 of	 public	 opinion	 on	 foreign	 policy	 spans	 many,	 if	 not	 most,	democracies.	 While	 Tomz	 and	 Weeks	 (2013)	 argue	 that	 their	 results	 are	generalizable	 "to	 countries	 with	 varying	 attitudes	 about	military	 action"	 (TOMZ	and	WEEKS,	 2013,	 p.	 860),	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 conclude	 this	 from	 their	 sample.	 The	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom	are	consolidated,	wealthy	democracies	that	enjoy	a	privileged	status	and	whose	citizens	are	somewhat	used	to	 interventions	abroad.	 Few	 countries	 are	 more	 alike,	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 are	 less	 like	 other	nations	 in	 so	many	 respects.	 The	 bulk	 of	 democracies	 are	 younger,	 poorer,	 and	possess	 histories	 of	 political	 instability.	 Many	 are	 also	 confronted	 by	 ongoing	border	 disputes,	 resource	 crises,	 and	 important	 gaps	 in	 human	 and	 national	security.	Given	prima	facie	claims	of	Anglo	exceptionalism	(c.f.,	LIPSET,	1996),	an	important	 next	 step	 is	 testing	 whether	 Tomz	 and	Weeks's	 2013	 results	 hold	 in	more	typical	democracies.	Further,	 explaining	 the	 relationship	 between	 public	 opinion	 and	 the	democratic	peace	also	requires	diverse	regime	types.	The	democratic	peace	is	 defined	 by	 behavioral	 differences	 between	 democratic	 and	 non-democratic	regimes.	 Thus,	 some	 consideration	 of	 public	 opinion	 in	 non-democracies	 is	warranted.	 If	 public	 opinion	 alone	 explains	 the	 democratic	 peace,	 then	 democratic	publics	 must	 typically	 prefer	 peace	 with	 other	 democracies,	 while	 non-democratic	publics	should	not	prefer	peace	with	democracies.	Of	 course,	 it	 may	 be	 that	 institutions	 matter	 as	 well	 —	 publics	 in	 non-democracies	 may	 have	 less	 influence	 over	 foreign	 policy	 than	 do	 democratic	publics.	However,	such	a	finding	would	shift	scholarly	focus	from	public	opinion	to	the	 role	 of	 democratic	 institutions.	 Indeed,	 it	 may	 be	 that	 all	 types	 of	 publics	generally	 oppose	 attacking	 democracies,	 but	 autocratic	 elites	 may	 ignore	 their	constituents,	while	democratic	 leaders	are	 forced	to	 listen	to	popular	preferences.	This	framework	could	also	account	for	the	democratic	peace.	However,	the	critical	causal	 variable	 in	 this	 framework	would	 be	 the	way	 that	 regimes	 differ	 in	 their	attentiveness	to	public	opinion.	Public	opinion	would	then	be	no	more	causal	as	a	variable	 —	 since	 it	 would	 not	 vary	 —than	 the	 venerable	 realist	 concept	 of	international	 anarchy.	 Instead,	 public	 opinion	 favorable	 to	 democracies	 would	
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merely	 be	 a	 'permissive	 condition'.	 Again,	 a	 critical	 first	 step	 is	 empirical:	measuring	public	attitudes	in	both	democracies	and	non-democracies.	Our	analysis	also	explores	the	role	of	international	institutions	in	opinion	formation.	Specifically,	our	survey	experiment	varies	whether	or	not	the	proposed	use	 of	 force	 has	 been	 endorsed	 by	 the	 United	 Nations.	 The	 inclusion	 of	 this	second	 treatment	 helps	 separate	 procedural	 democracy	 from	 'good'	 countries.	Although	academics	have	learned	to	use	terms	like	'democracy'	with	considerable	analytical	precision,	it	does	not	follow	that	our	subjects	have	in	mind	the	Freedom	House	 definition.	 Democracy	may	 simply	 serve	 as	 a	 convenient	 proxy	 for	 things	respondents	 deem	 to	 be	 good	 or	 similar	 to	 themselves	 or	 their	 nation.	 Subjects	may	 treat	 the	 researcher's	 use	 of	 the	 term	 as	 an	 authoritative	 cue	 that	 force	 is	unwarranted,	 and	 that	 recommending	 military	 action	 will	 be	 frowned	 upon.	Subjects	may	also	view	the	approval	of	 international	 institutions	as	an	important	mechanism	for	assessing	the	legitimacy	of	proposed	uses	of	force,	as	suggested	by	sources	in	the	literature.		Just	as	'princely	virtues'	were	once	presented	as	the	standard	by	which	the	behavior	of	political	 leaders	was	 to	be	evaluated—even	 though	very	 few	princes	actually	exhibited	these	virtues—so	too	'democracy'	has	now	come	to	represent	a	broad	 and	 amorphous	 set	 of	 desirable	 national	 qualities.	 Almost	 every	 country	claims	to	be	a	democracy,	even	those	that	clearly	do	not	qualify	by	any	reasonable	definition.	At	the	same	time,	enemies	are	capable	of	misrepresenting	regime	type.	Saddam	 Hussein	 and	 Fidel	 Castro	 each	 claimed	 that	 their	 regimes	 were	democratic,	 and	each	offered	a	 skeptical	view	of	democracy	 in	 the	United	States.	Symbolic	or	socially	 constructed	 interpretations	of	democracy	are	bound	 to	appear	among	subjects	from	powerful	western	nations,	where	a	country's	virtues	will	tend	to	be	associated	with	a	willingness	to	accept	the	status	quo.	Rather	than	 capturing	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 political	 institutions	 of	 democracy	 on	 the	willingness	 of	 subjects	 to	 advocate	 war,	 experimental	 research	 may	 really	 be	measuring	whether	the	hypothetical	opponent	is	perceived	to	be	in	good	standing	with	the	international	order	or	is	even	hostile	or	friendly.	
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A	partial	solution	may	stem	from	evidence	 that	 international	 institutions	help	to	shape	public	preferences	involving	the	use	of	force7.	Experimental	work	on	the	 effects	 of	 IOs	 (international	 organizations)	 on	 public	 opinion	 (TINGLEY	 and	TOMZ,	 2012)	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 United	 Nations	 Security	 Council's	 (UNSC)	approval	boosts	public	 support	 for	war	via	a	process	of	 'legalizing'	 the	proposed	action	by	granting	 it	moral	authority,	 serving	as	a	useful	heuristic	 for	 the	public.	While	the	regime	type	of	the	target	country	may	be	perceived	as	'cheap	talk'	on	the	part	of	strategic	actors,	approval	from	IOs	may	serve	as	a	more	reliable	and	costly	cue	from	an	authoritative	entity	for	determining	individuals'	stances	on	the	use	of	force.	Existing	literature	has	documented	the	'second	opinion	role'	of	IOs	(GRIECO	et	al.,	2011);	it	shows	that	the	American	public	is	affected	by	IO	approval	of	the	use	of	 force	 because	 it	 provides	 a	 credible	 cue	 that	 such	 use	 of	 force	 is	 good	 policy	(CHAPMAN,	2011;	GRIECO	et	al.,	2011).	We	use	 international	 institutional	approval	of	 the	use	of	 force	 to	 control	for	the	virtues	of	a	potential	target.	Specifically,	we	vary	whether	or	not	the	use	of	force	has	been	approved	by	the	United	Nations.	We	thus	measure	the	impact	of	regime	type	on	public	attitudes	in	an	environment	where	the	international	community	has	judged	action	necessary,	and	in	one	where	it	has	not.	Previous	attempts	to	tie	public	opinion	to	the	democratic	peace	have	not	considered	 that	 this	 relationship	 may	 be	 mediated	 through	 international	institutions,	 or	 that	 'democracy'	 itself	 may	 be	 interpreted	 by	 subjects	 as	 an	authoritative	 cue	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 they	 should	 oppose	 the	 exercise	 of	 military	violence.	 Combined	with	 the	 exceptional	 nature	 of	 the	 samples	 used	 in	 previous	studies,	the	danger	is	that	the	impact	of	popular	preferences	is	either	too	ubiquitous	or	too	unusual	to	conform	to	the	dyadic	macro	observation	that	democracies	do	not	fight	each	 other,	 while	 other	 combinations	 of	 regimes	 continue	 to	 interact	 through	force.	We	explore	 these	possibilities	by	means	of	 the	 survey	experiment	 that	we	detail	below.		______________________________________________________________________________________________	7An	 international	 resolution	 also	 serves	 as	 a	 commitment	 mechanism,	 encouraging	 domestic	publics	to	'rally	round	the	flag'	and	may	even	lead	foreign	publics	to	advocate	caution	from	their	own	 governments	 (THOMPSON,	 2006).	 International	 institutional	 approval	 further	 implies greater	support	and	lower	costs	for	states	or	coalitions	authorized	to	use	force,	making	contests	less	objectionable	to	domestic	publics. 
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Experimental	design	The	 ideal	experiment	on	public	opinion	and	 the	democratic	peace	would	measure	 the	 support	 of	 subjects	 for	 their	 government's	 use	 of	 force	 against	every	country.	An	opponent's	regime	type	would	be	randomly	assigned,	and	each	country	would	face	identical	scenarios	and	geopolitical	contexts.	Our	resources	are	too	 limited	 to	 survey	 every	 country,	 and	 each	 country	 faces	 unique	 security	environments	 that	 no	 doubt	 affect	 public	 perspectives	 (compare,	 for	 example,	Iceland	 and	 Israel).	 However,	 we	 believe	 that	 careful	 case	 selection	 and	 an	experimental	 design	 that	 decontextualizes	 security	 threats	 helps	 to	 advance	 the	literature.	Our	 study	 involved	 survey	 experiments	 in	 China	 and	 Brazil.	 As	 with	previous	work	(LACINA	and	LEE,	2013;	TOMZ	and	WEEKS,	2013),	we	use	internet-based	 polling.	 Subjects	 in	 each	 country	 were	 asked	 to	 read	 short	 scenarios	('vignettes')	about	crises	involving	two	hypothetical	countries	('A'	and	'B')	and	to	express	their	support	for	using	force.	Two	treatments	were	randomly	assigned:	the	regime	type	of	Country	B	and	UN	authorization	for	Country	A's	use	of	force.	Our	survey	used	 the	 following	 format.	The	script	was	 translated	 into	 the	local	language8.	Prior	to	reading	the	script,	subjects	were	advised	that	the	scenario	is	hypothetical	and	should	not	be	read	as	if	it	referred	to	any	particular	country9:	a	country	in	the	same	part	of	the	world	as	'Country	A'	is	developing	nuclear	weapons	and	will	have	 its	 first	nuclear	bomb	within	six	months.	This	country	(Country	B)	could	 then	 threaten	 other	 countries	 in	 the	 region	 with	 possible	 nuclear	 attack.	'Country	 A'	 has	 attempted	 to	 resolve	 the	 situation	 peacefully,	 but	 'Country	 B'	refuses	 to	 stop	 or	 even	 discuss	 the	 issue.	 Additional	 information:	 'Country	 A'	would	 almost	 certainly	 defeat	 'Country	 B'	 in	 a	 military	 dispute.	 If	 'Country	 B'	acquires	 nuclear	weapons,	 it	 will	 have	 the	 power	 to	 blackmail	 or	 destroy	 other	countries.	'Country	B'	is	[not]	a	democracy.	If	'Country	A'	attacks,	it	will	be	able	to	______________________________________________________________________________________________	8To	 assess	 quality/consistency,	 different	 translators	 re-translated	 each	 translation	 back	 into	English.	 See	 Harvard	 Dataverse	 for	 the	 questionnaires	 in	 Portuguese	 and	 in	 simplified	 and	Traditional	 Chinese.	 Note	 that	 our	 Chinese	 respondents	 had	 the	 option	 to	 view	 the	 survey	 in	either	version:	https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/TITSCV		9The	 treatments	 are	 in	 italic.	 The	 vignette	 includes	 explicit	 reference	 to	 Country	 A's	 military	dominance	over	 'Country	B'	 to	control	 for	respondents'	perception	about	 the	 likelihood	of	Country	A's	victory	(GELPI,	FEAVER	and	REIFLER,	2006).	
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destroy	 'Country	 B's'	 nuclear	 development	 sites	 and	 prevent	 'Country	 B'	 from	developing	nuclear	weapons.	The	United	Nations	has	[not]	authorized	'Country	A'	to	use	force	against	'Country	B'	to	resolve	the	situation.	Immediately	 after	 the	 vignette,	 subjects	 were	 asked:	 should	 'Country	 A'	attack	 and	 use	 force	 to	 resolve	 the	 situation?	 Subjects	 were	 given	 only	 two	options,	attack	or	not	attack.	The	 first	 treatment	 involves	 a	 simple	 dichotomous	 assignment	 of	 the	regime	 type	of	 the	nominal	 target	of	potential	military	action:	democratic	or	not	democratic.	 This	 treatment	 consists	 of	 a	 one-word	 change	 in	 the	 vignette,	identifying	the	target	country	as	a	democratic	neighbor	of	 the	potential	 initiating	state,	 or	 as	 a	 non-democratic	 neighbor.	 Explaining	 the	 observation	 of	 the	democratic	 peace	 with	 public	 opinion	 requires	 that	 democratic	 publics	 are	 not	generally	 less	 willing	 to	 use	 force	 –	 only	 uniquely	 more	 peaceful	 toward	 other	democracies.	The	second	treatment	varies	UN	authorization	for	Country	A's	use	of	force	against	 'Country	 B'.	 Extensive	 theoretical	 research	 identifies	 the	 approval	 of	international	 institutions	as	a	key	factor	 in	determining	popular	support	 for	war.	One	 strain	 of	 thought	 emphasizes	 the	 legitimizing	 effect	 of	 authorization	 by	 an	international	 institution	 (FINNEMORE,	 2003;	 HURD,	 2007).	 A	 second	perspective	 argues	 that	 international	 approval	 plays	 an	 informational	 role,	reducing	uncertainty	about	the	likely	reaction	of	the	international	community	to	a	state's	use	of	force	(BOEHMER	et	al.	2004;	CHAPMAN,	2011;	FANG,	2008;	GRIECO	et	 al.,	 2011;	 VOETEN,	 2005).	 The	 combination	 of	 regime	 type	 and	 international	institutional	support	for	using	force	defines	2x2=4	treatments.	The	 impact	 of	 democracy	 in	 encouraging	 peace	 could	 be	 attributed	 to	domestic	 and/or	 international	 institutions.	 Democracies	may	 be	 perceived	 to	 be	more	 peaceful	 because	 of	 the	 mechanisms,	 such	 as	 elections,	 legislatures	 and	courts,	 that	allow	popular	 influence	over	foreign	policy.	 International	 institutions	could	 also	 precipitate	 peace	 through	 their	 authority	 or	 legitimacy,	 or	 because	subjects	 perceive	 approval	 as	 indicating	 something	 about	 the	 target	 state	 in	 the	vignette.	Including	an	experimental	control	for	international	approval	will	thus	aid	in	assessing	the	effect	of	regime	type	on	popular	preferences.	While	we	are	not	directly	concerned	here	with	unraveling	 the	 causal	mechanisms	 linking	UN	approval	with	
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public	 opinion,	 we	 include	 questions	 in	 the	 survey	 about	 whether	 respondents	care	 whether	 their	 country	 cooperates	 with	 the	 United	 Nations,	 whether	 their	country	 cooperates	with	other	 countries	 in	 the	 region,	 and	whether	 they	believe	their	government	should	be	more	or	less	active	in	world	affairs.	For	 consistency	 with	 previous	 work,	 our	 vignette	 discusses	 a	 crisis	involving	a	hypothetical	neighboring	country's	pursuit	of	nuclear	weapons	(TOMZ	and	WEEKS,	2013).	Research	is	divided	on	the	 impact	of	nuclear	proliferation	on	interstate	 conflict	 (c.f.,	KROENIG,	2013;	 SAGAN	and	WALTZ,	2012;	 SECHSER	and	FUHRMANN,	 2013).	 Nevertheless,	 most	 people	 seem	 to	 think	 that	 nuclear	weapons	are	dangerous,	particularly	in	instances	where	an	adversary	is	allowed	to	acquire	nuclear	capabilities.	Our	vignette	about	possible	nuclear	proliferation	in	a	neighboring	 state	 with	 generally	 hostile	 relations	 should	 thus	 tap	 into	 popular	attitudes	 about	 the	dangers	of	 proliferation	 and	 capture	 variation	 in	 support	 for	the	use	of	military	force	attributable	to	democracy.	We	intentionally	use	hypothetical	labels	for	the	two	states	in	our	vignettes,	referring	 only	 to	 'Country	 A'	 and	 'Country	 B'.	 Previous	 work	 has	 focused	 on	whether	 a	 respondent's	 own	 country	 should	 use	 force.	While	 not	 unreasonable,	vignettes	 with	 descriptive	 and/or	 contextual	 labels	 pose	 confounding	 problems.	Consider	 the	 potential	 confounders	 of	 asking	 Brazilian	 subjects	 whether	 a	neighbor	 should	be	prevented	 from	proliferating.	Most	will	have	some	difficulty	imagining	a	grave	 threat	emanating	 from	Paraguay	(at	 least	since	 the	War	of	 the	Triple	Alliance).	A	few	may	recall	that	Argentina	had	a	nuclear	weapons	program	in	 the	 1980s.	 Further,	 today,	 every	 one	 of	 Brazil's	 immediate	 neighbors	 is	 a	democracy10.	 What	 country	 will	 they	 think	 of	 if	 asked	 to	 consider	 using	 force	against	 a	 neighboring	 nondemocracy?	 The	 closest	 nondemocracy	 is	 Cuba,	 with	whom	Brazil	has	generally	friendly	relations.	In	contrast,	China	has	democratic	and	non-democratic	neighbors,	some	of	whom	are	already	nuclear	powers.	A	Chinese	respondent	 might	 think	 of	 North	 Korean	 proliferation,	 Japanese	 latent	 nuclear	capabilities,	concerns	about	South	Korea	and	Taiwan,	as	well	as	neighbors	 like	Mongolia	or	Bhutan	on	one	hand	and	India	and	Pakistan	on	the	other.	Contextual	______________________________________________________________________________________________	10Venezuela	may	be	sliding	into	authoritarianism.	
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factors	could	confound	results	and	make	cross-national	comparisons	difficult.	It	is	difficult	 to	 imagine	 that	 we	 could	 learn	 anything	 generalizable	 about	 the	democratic	 peace	 by	 comparing	 Brazilians’	 thoughts	 on	 attacking	 Cuba	 with	Chinese	attitudes	toward	Japan.	Democratic	peace	theory	 is	supposed	to	be	context	 free.	Countries	 in	 the	theory	 have	 regime	 type	 labels	 but	 proper	 nouns	 are	 absent.	 A	 faithful	 test	 of	democratic	peace	theory	thus	 involves	questions	about	hypothetical	democracies	or	non-democracies,	not	about	particular	countries	in	specific	contexts.	We	create	a	much	more	general	framework	for	assessing	the	willingness	to	use	force	—	one	that	more	nearly	 reflects	 the	 axiomatic	nature	of	 democratic	peace	 theory	—	by	using	generic	country	names	in	our	vignettes.	Our	approach	is	also	useful	in	simplifying	the	process	of	 conducting	 surveys	 in	 locations	where	government	officials	might	reject	more	specific	or	pointed	survey	questions	addressing	national	policy.	The	 choice	 to	 use	 generic	 country	 names	 also	 has	 a	 more	 practical	 motive.	Survey	 firms	 in	 China	 are	 hesitant	 to	 ask	 any	 direct	 questions	 about	 Chinese	national	 security	 policy,	 and	 such	 questions	 are	 illegal	 under	 Chinese	 rules	 on	research	(LÜ,	2016).		Our	 design	 allows	 us	 to	 test	 the	 generalizability	 of	 Tomz	 and	 Weeks'	(2013)	key	findings.	Rather	than	trying	to	measure	public	opinion	experimentally	in	all	countries,	or	even	selecting	a	representative	sample	of	states,	we	focus	on	a	pair	 of	 'critical	 case'	 countries,	 where	 popular	 preferences	 are	 most	 likely	 to	delineate	 the	 scope	of	previous	 findings	and	connect	micro	 level	opinion	data	 to	the	 macro	 democratic	 peace	 observation.	 As	 emerging,	 non-Western	 powers,	Brazil	and	China	also	offer	a	geo-strategic	justification	for	their	selection.	Each	is	a	member	 of	 the	 'BRICs',	 with	 rising	 status	 in	 the	 global	 system,	 even	 as	 each	represents	 an	 important	 challenger	 and	 focus	 for	opposition	 to	 the	 international	status	 quo.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 Brazil	 and	 China	 provide	 key	 variance	 in	 terms	 of	regime	type.	Of	course,	an	 important	 limitation	of	 this	design	 is	 that	we	are	only	examining	two	countries,	and	any	country-specific	 idiosyncrasies	could	confound	our	 findings,	 so	 that	 we	 cannot	 generalize	 to	 all	 developing	 democracies	 or	 all	developing	 autocracies.	 We	 will	 test	 for	 security	 context	 heterogeneity	 in	treatment	 effects	 and	 will	 also	 address	 the	 limitations	 of	 our	 findings	 in	 the	discussion.	
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Sample	Our	 initial	 survey	 experiment	 was	 conducted	 online	 in	 August	 and	September	 of	 201311.	We	 collected	 a	 total	 of	 4,214	 responses	 from	 Brazil	 and	 5,744	responses	 from	 China.	 We	 conducted	 a	 follow-up	 study	 in	 China	 using	 a	 more	representative	 sample	 recruited	 by	 YouGov,	where	we	 collected	 2,500	 responses	 in	April	2015.	Survey	responses	were	recorded	 in	an	online	anonymous	survey,	with	subjects	 recruited	 by	 professional	 polling	 companies	 in	 each	 country.	 Subjects	were	 provided	 with	 an	 online	 link	 to	 the	 survey	 experiment,	 which	 was	programmed	 in	 the	 local	 language,	 and	 routed	back	 to	 the	 survey	 firm's	website	where	 subjects	 were	 compensated	 for	 participating	 in	 the	 survey.	 We	 adopted	many	 of	 Peifer	 and	 Garrett's	 (2014)	 recommended	 best-practices	 for	 online	panels,	 and	 data	 were	 screened	 for	 duplicate	 responses.	 Following	 Tomz	 and	Weeks	(2013),	we	also	collected	subjects'	demographic	information	—	age,	gender,	education,	income,	religiosity,	and	interest	in	international	news	—	and	foreign	policy	attitudes,	such	as	militarism,	internationalism,	and	nationalism.		While	 each	 sample	 of	 respondents	 is	 not	 perfectly	 representative	 of	 the	population	of	 the	 two	countries,	 they	give	us	a	good	picture	of	 the	opinions	of	middle	class,	well-educated	citizens,	a	sample	population	that	is	particularly	well	disposed	to	reflect	 the	values	sought	 in	democratic	peace	research.	Table	01	reports	some	descriptive	statistics	of	the	respondents12.	Chinese	respondents	were	more	 militaristic	 and	 nationalistic	 than	 Brazilians,	 but	 they	 were	 also	 more	internationalist	 on	 our	 composite	 scale.	 As	 expected,	 Brazilian	 respondents	were	 more	 religious	 than	 Chinese	 respondents.	 In	 other	 respects,	 however,	 the	Brazilian	 sample	 was	 comparable	 demographically	 to	 the	 Chinese	 sample.	 In	general,	 both	 groups	 were	 young,	 well-educated,	 economically	 stable,	 and	distinctly	interested	in	international	affairs.	______________________________________________________________________________________________	11The	 data	 and	 the	 code	 to	 reproduce	 results	 will	 be	 available	 on	 all	 authors'	 websites	 after	publication,	as	well	as	in	Harvard	Dataverse	(DOI:	https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PNDP4V).	12Attitudinal	measures	—	militarism,	internationalism,	nationalism,	religiosity	—	are	scaled	on	a	0-1	 interval.	 For	 the	 Brazilian	 sample,	 Cronbach's	 alpha	 for	 the	 militarism	 index	 was	 0.28,	0.65	for	internationalism,	and	0.61	for	nationalism.	For	the	China	sample,	Cronbach's	alpha	was	 0.49	 for	 militarism,	 0.42	 for	 internationalism,	 and	 for	 0.41	 nationalism.	 Please	 see	 the	Appendix	for	additional	information	on	each	sample	(Table	S05,	Table	S06,	Table	S07,	Table	S08).	
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How	might	these	sampling	frames	affect	results?	Without	observing	a	fully	representative	sample,	we	cannot	be	sure,	but	we	did	examine	 the	World	Values	Survey	 from	Wave	 06	 (INGLEHART	 et	 al.,	 2014)	 for	 some	 indications.	 For	 both	Brazil	 and	 China,	 we	 examined	 the	 relationship	 between	 internet	 access,	education,	 and	 respondent	 ratings	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 democracy.	 For	 both	countries,	 daily	 internet	 access	 increases	 the	percentage	of	 respondents	 that	 say	democracy	 is,	 'absolutely	 important'	 by	 about	 10	 percentage	 points	 (Brazil,	 no	access	to	internet,	44%	versus	daily	access	55%;	China	no	access	26%,	daily	access	36%).	Similarly,	comparing	attitudes	about	democracy	as	a	function	of	education,	the	percentage	responding	that	democracy	is	'absolutely	important'	increases	with	education,	 but	 similarly	 in	 both	 countries.	 Respondents	 with	 a	 primary	 school	education	who	called	democracy,	'absolutely	important'	were	40%	of	respondents	in	Brazil	and	28%	of	respondents	 in	China;	 for	those	with	a	secondary	education	the	percentages	were	49%	and	35%.		
Table	01.	Descriptive	statistics	of	the	samples		 Brazil	 China		 	 Sample	01	 Sample	02	Mean	 	 	 				Militarism	(0-1)	 0.258	 0.510	 0.460				Internationalism	(0-1)	 0.599	 0.718	 0.698				Nationalism	(0-1)	 0.410	 0.744	 0.734				Religiosity	(0-1)	 0.338	 0.098	 0.087				Age	 36.112	 31.375	 32.288	Read	International	News	(Days	Per	Week)	 4.059	 4.551	 3.472	Median	Education	 Some	College	 College	Degree	 College	Degree	Income	Quintile	 4th	 4th	 2nd	Percentage	Male	 	 48.090	 	56.513	 	 57.640	Religious	 85.587	 43.318	 44.837	Overall	N	 4,214	 5,744	 2,500	Source:	Prepared	by	the	authors	with	their	own	data.	Note:	 There	 is	 no	 significant	 difference	 at	 the	 0.05	 level	 on	 any	 demographic	 covariates	 across	treatments,	 barring	 the	 Brazil	 sample's	 religiosity.	 The	 p-value	 for	 the	 ANOVA	 of	 the	 Brazilian	sample's	religiosity	on	treatment	was	0.0496,	close	to	being	insignificant	at	the	0.05	level.		Consequently,	excluding	those	with	no	internet	access	or	with	the	lowest	educational	 levels	 will	 probably	 inflate	 the	 impact	 of	 democracy,	 and	 given	 the	similar	 relationships	 between	 internet	 access	 and	 democracy	 observed	 in	 the	World	Values	Survey	(INGLEHART	et	al.,	2014),	this	effect	will	likely	be	similar	in	
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each	 country.	 Note	 that	 the	 same	 pattern	 is	 even	 stronger	 in	 the	 United	 States,	where	previous	work	on	 this	 topic	has	used	 internet-based	 surveys	 (no	 internet	access,	 democracy	 'absolutely	 important',	 37%,	 daily	 internet	 access,	 52%).	 For	our	study,	this	means	we	can	still	explore	whether	patterns	in	Brazil	and	China	are	different	 than	or	the	same	as	those	documented	in	the	United	States,	but	we	cannot	claim	that	our	results	are	representative	of	all	Brazilians	or	all	Chinese.	We	partially	 addressed	 this	 with	 our	 second	 sample	 where	 we	 oversampled	 low	education	respondents.	In	an	ideal	world,	we	would	have	a	fully	representative	sample	for	both	of	our	cases.	Tomz	and	Weeks	(2013)	do	not	provide	this,	even	using	samples	from	the	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom.	A	representative	sample	in	an	internet	survey	 in	China,	and	to	a	 lesser	extent,	Brazil	would	be	quite	difficult	—	perhaps	impossible	—	to	obtain.	In	practice,	our	sample	is	heavily	weighted	towards	elites,	especially	 in	 China.	 This	 has	 some	 benefits.	 Urban	 elites	 are	most	 likely	 to	 have	opinions	on	foreign	policy.	Elites	are	also	the	most	likely	group	to	influence	foreign	policy,	especially	in	an	authoritarian	regime,	where	social	networking	sites,	online	discussions,	and	calls	for	collective	action	are	closely	monitored.		
Results	The	 sections	 below	 review	 the	 major	 findings	 for	 our	 study.	 The	 results	reveal	 surprising	 differences	 and	 remarkable	 similarities	 across	 two	populations	with	 very	 different	 cultures	 and	 political	 structures.	 A	 final	 section	attempts	to	make	sense	of	these	findings.			
Main	effects	of	regime	type	Table	02	 reports	 the	effect	of	 the	 target	 country's	 regime	 type	on	public	support	for	the	use	of	force	in	Brazil	and	China.	Figures	are	the	percentage	of	 subjects	 in	 each	 country	 and	 treatment	 that	 answered	 'yes',	 when	 asked	whether	'Country	A'	should	use	force	against	'Country	B'.	Citizens	of	both	countries	were	significantly	less	likely	to	support	the	use	of	force	against	a	democracy	than	against	a	non-democracy.	Only	32	percent	of	Brazilian	subjects	—	less	than	a	third	—	 supported	 attacking	 a	 democracy	whereas	 nearly	 40	 percent	 backed	military	
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action	 against	 a	 non-democratic	 target.	 The	 estimated	 effect	 of	 regime	 type	was	thus	 -7.7	 percentage	 points	 in	 Brazil,	 significant	 at	 the	 0.05	 level.	 Chinese	subjects	 were	 uniformly	 more	 willing	 to	 support	 the	 use	 of	 force.	 Over	 fifty	percent	 of	 Chinese	 subjects	 supported	 using	 force	 against	 'Country	 B'	 in	 both	treatments.	However,	there	was	a	significantly	smaller	effect	of	democracy.	When	'Country	B'	was	democratic,	 50	percent	 of	 Chinese	 respondents	 advocated	using	force.	Support	for	using	 force	 increased	only	modestly,	 to	approximately	53	percent,	when	the	target	was	a	non-democracy.	The	effect	of	regime	type	is	thus	about	 -2.8	 percentage	 points	 for	 Sample	 01	 and	 the	 YouGov	 Sample	 with	 the	former	—	but	not	the	latter	—significant	at	the	0.05	level.		These	 experimentally-generated	 effects	 demonstrate	 consistency	 with	findings	 offered	 by	 Tomz	 and	Weeks	 (2013).	 Brazilian	 subjects	 are	 reluctant	 to	advocate	war	with	a	democracy.	Chinese	respondents	show	the	same	tendency	but	are:	 01.	 more	 willing	 to	 use	 force;	 and	 02.	 less	 responsive	 to	 the	 democracy	treatment.		
Table	02.	Percentage	support	for	attacking	and	the	effect	of	democracy		 Brazil	 China	 		 %	Support	for	Attacking	 N	 Sample	01	%	Support	for	Attacking	 Sample	02	%	Support	for	Attacking	 N	Democratic	target	 32.070	 2,111	 50.090	 2,793	50.977	 1,228	Non-democratic	target	 39.838	 2,101	 52.847	 2,950	53.785	 1,268	Effect	of	democracy	95	%	C.I.	 -7.768	(-10.658	to	-4.877)	 	 -2.758	(-5.344	to	-0.171)	 -2.808	(-6.729	to	1.113)	 	Source:	Prepared	by	the	authors	with	their	own	data.	Note:	 The	 table	 shows	 the	 percentages	 of	 respondents	 who	 supported	military	 action	 against	 a	democratic	target	and	a	non-democratic	target.	The	difference	in	the	percentages	is	considered	as	the	effect	of	democracy.		 Table	 03	 shows	 support	 for	 the	 use	 of	 force	 by	 regime	 type	 and	 by	 UN	approval.	The	effect	of	democracy	persists	after	controlling	for	UN	approval	for	the	Brazilian	 sample	 but	 not	 for	 the	 Chinese	 samples.	 For	Brazil,	 only	 38	 percent	 of	respondents	 supported	 a	 UN-approved	 attack	 against	 the	 democratic	 nuclear	proliferator,	 while	 roughly	 47	 percent	 endorsed	 an	 attack	 against	 a	 non-
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democratic	 target	with	 UN	 approval.	 The	 impact	 of	 democracy	 for	 the	 Brazilian	sample	 treated	 with	 UN	 approval	 was	 thus	 -9	 percentage	 points.	 The	 effect	 of	democracy	was	 also	 significant	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 UN	 approval,	 but	was	 smaller.	Approximately	 26	 percent	 of	 Brazilian	 respondents	 supported	 an	 attack	against	 a	 democratic	 nuclear	 proliferator	 without	 UN	 authorization	 whereas	about	 31	 percent	 backed	 an	 attack	 against	 a	 non-democratic	 target	 without	 UN	approval.	 The	 effect	 of	 democracy	 for	 the	Brazilian	 sample	without	UN	approval	decreased	 to	 -5	 percentage	points,	 smaller	 than	 its	 equivalent	with	UN	 approval	but	still	statistically	significant.	For	Chinese	respondents,	the	effect	of	democracy	was	much	smaller	and	at	times	 insignificant	 after	 controlling	 for	 UN	 approval.	 When	 force	 was	approved	 by	 the	United	Nations,	 54	percent	 of	 Chinese	 respondents	 in	 the	 first	sample	 and	 58	 percent	 in	 the	 YouGov	 sample	 backed	 an	 attack	 against	 a	democracy	 compared	 with	 56	 percent	 and	 58	 percent	 who	 supported	 military	action	against	a	non-democracy,	a	difference	that	is	not	statistically	significant.	The	effect	 of	 democracy	 was	 also	 smaller	 for	 Chinese	 respondents	 in	 the	 'no	 UN	approval'	 condition.	 Approximately	 45	 percent	 of	 those	 assigned	 democratic	Country	 B	without	UN	approval	 in	 the	 first	 study	 and	44	percentage	 in	 the	YouGov	study	favored	an	attack	versus	nearly	49	percent	 in	the	case	of	a	non-democratic	Country	B	 for	both	samples.	The	effect	of	 regime	 type	was	again	 insignificant.	 In	each	 country,	 the	 difference	 was	 not	 significant;	 variation	 in	 the	 size	 of	 the	democracy	effect	was	not	significant.	The	table	also	reveals	the	effect	of	UN	approval	on	willingness	to	advocate	force.	 In	 both	 countries,	 the	 effect	 is	 much	 larger	 than	 for	 democracy.	 For	Brazilians	 facing	 a	 democratic	 target,	 UN	 approval	 produces	 nearly	 a	 12-percentage	 point	 increase	 in	 willingness	 to	 use	 force.	 The	 effect	 is	 even	 larger	when	 regarding	 non-democratic	 targets	 (almost	 17	 percentage	 points).	 Both	 of	these	 effects	 are	 statistically	 significant.	 For	 Chinese	 subjects,	 the	 impact	 of	 UN	approval	is	close	to	8	percentage	points	—	and	14	and	09	percentage	points	in	the	YouGov	sample	—	in	democratic	and	non-democratic	treatments.			
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Table	03.	Percentage	support	for	an	attack	and	the	effect	of	democracy,	controlling	for	UN	approval		 	 	 Democratic	target	 Non	democratic	target	 Effect	of	democracy	 95%	C.	I.	Brazil	 UN	Approval	 38.086	 47.729	 -9.643	 (-13.839	to	-5.447)	%	Support	for	attack	N	 1045	 1079	 	 	No	UN	Approval	 26.173	 31.507	 -5.334	 (9.216	to	-1.452)	%	Support	for	attack	N	 1066	 1022	 	 	China	 Sample	01	 UN	Approval	 54.435	 56.868	 -2.433	 (-6.080	to	1.214)	%	Support	for	attack	N	 1398	 1456	 	 	No	UN	Approval	 45.735	 48.929	 -3.194	 (-6.838	to	0.450)	%	Support	for	attack	N	 1395	 1494	 	 	Sample	02	 UN	Approval	 58.347	 58.665	 -0.318	 (-5.799	to	5.163)	%	Support	for	attack	N	 617	 629	 	 	No	UN	Approval	 43.535	 48.983	 -5.448	 (-10.979	to	0.083)	%	Support	for	attack	N	 611	 639	 	 	Source:	Prepared	by	the	authors	with	their	own	data.	Note:	The	table	displays	the	percentages	of	respondents	who	supported	military	action	against	a	democratic	target	and	a	non-democratic	target,	controlling	for	UN	approval.	The	difference	in	the	percentages	is	considered	as	the	effect	of	democracy.				 These	results	suggest	several	initial	conclusions.	First,	there	is	an	effect	of	democracy	in	Brazil,	and	evidence	of	a	suggestive	but	not	significant	effect	in	China.	Second,	 in	 both	 cases,	 there	 is	 an	 even	 larger	 impact	 of	UN	 approval	on	 the	willingness	 to	use	 force.	 Finally,	 our	Chinese	 subjects	 are	generally	more	supportive	 of	 using	 force	 than	 are	 our	 Brazilian	 subjects.	 These	 differences	between	Brazil	and	China	are	striking	but	may	reflect	demographic	differences	or	other	features	of	 sample	variability.	For	example,	China's	 sample	 is	younger	and	more	male	than	the	Brazilian	sample,	variables	associated	with	a	willingness	to	 advocate	 force.	We	 next	 conduct	multivariate	 analysis	 to	 address	 a	 variety	 of	demographic	and	attitudinal	variables.		
Robustness	checks	We	complement	our	basic	analysis	with	robustness	checks	in	the	presence	of	 control	variables.	We	adopt	 two	strategies.	First,	we	use	 logistic	 regression	 to	
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predict	 support	 for	 'Country	 A'	 using	 force	 against	 'Country	 B',	 controlling	 for	demographic	and	attitudinal	variables.	Second,	we	examine	the	simple	effect	of	democracy	for	different	values	of	control	variables.		Table	04	reports	results	from	a	logistic	regression	of	respondent	support	for	 the	 use	 of	 force	 incorporating	 both	 our	 experimental	 variables	 and	 also	attitudinal	 and	 demographic	 controls.	 The	 variable	 labels	 'Democracy'	 and	 'UN	Approval'	 denote	 the	 experimental	 treatments.	 Following	 existing	 works	 on	support	 for	 the	 use	 of	 force,	 'Militarism',	 'Internationalism'	 (HURWITZ	 and	PEFFLEY,	 1987;	 HERRMANN	 et	 al.,	 1999;	 TOMZ	 and	 WEEKS,	 2013),	 and	'Nationalism'	(JOHNS	and	DAVIES,	2012)	are	composite	measures	that	control	for	a	respondent's	basic	foreign	policy	disposition.	The	 results	 reiterate	 the	 earlier	 summary	 tables:	 regime	 type	 and	international	 organization	 approval	 affect	 subjects'	 attitudes	 toward	 the	 use	 of	force,	in	both	Brazil	and	China.	In	both	countries,	respondents	are	significantly	less	willing	to	approve	the	use	of	force	against	a	democracy	but	are	much	more	willing	to	 support	 an	 attack	 sanctioned	 by	 the	 United	 Nations.	 Variables	 for	 both	treatments	 are	 significant	 at	 the	 0.05	 level	 in	 both	 countries.	 Both	 sets	 of	coefficients	 are	 consistent	with	 our	 basic	 results;	 democracy	diminishes	 support	for	using	force,	while	support	for	war	increases	with	UN	endorsement.	Many	 of	 the	 demographic	 variables	 are	 statistically	 significant	 for	 Brazil	but	 not	 for	 China,	 though	 the	 signs	 are	 nearly	 always	 the	 same.	 For	 Brazil,	demographic	 factors	 such	 as	 age,	 gender,	 education,	 income,	 and	 interest	 in	international	 news	 are	 all	 significant	 at	 the	 0.05	 level.	 Older,	 female,	 better-educated	Brazilians	were	more	likely	to	oppose	war,	while	Brazilians	with	higher	incomes	and	a	strong	 interest	 in	 international	news	were	more	 likely	 to	support	war.	The	lack	of	significance	for	most	Chinese	demographics	controls	may	reflect	sampling	differences.	The	Chinese	sample	is	less	demographically	diverse	than	the	Brazil	 sample;	 there	 is	 less	 variance	 to	 leverage	 in	 estimating	 these	 coefficients.	Generally,	Chinese	respondents	tend	to	be	younger	than	Brazilian	respondents;	the	mean	age	for	Chinese	respondents	is	31	(Sample	01)	or	32	(YouGov	Sample),	with	a	standard	deviation	of	8	(Sample	01)	or	about	11	(YouGov	Sample),	whereas	the	mean	 age	 for	 Brazilian	 subjects	 is	 36	 and	 the	 standard	 deviation	 is	 12.	
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Chinese	respondents	are	overall	better	educated,	with	73	percent	reporting	that	they	 have	 a	 college	 degree	 whereas	 only	 26	 percent	 of	 Brazilian	 respondents	claiming	 this	 level	 of	 formal	 education.	 Chinese	 respondents	 are	 also	much	 less	religious	 than	 Brazilian	 respondents,	 85	 percent	 of	 whom	 reported	 having	 a	religion13.		
Table	 04.	 Logistic	 regressions	 of	 support	 for	 attacks	 among	 Brazilian	 and	 Chinese	subjects		 	 Dependent	variable	Support	for	Attacks		 Brazil	 China		 	 Sample	01	 Sample	02	Democracy	 0.359***	 0.188**	 0.249**	(0.114)	 (0.082)	 (0.124)	UN	Approval	 0.662***	 0.400***	 0.509***	(0.107)	 (0.082)	 (0.124)	Militarism	 1.627***	 1.752***	 1.253***	(0.128)	 (0.077)	 (0.115)	Internationalism	 0.803***	 -0.783***	 -0.483	(0.223)	 (0.246)	 (0.366)	Nationalism	 0.471***	 0.825***	 0.799***	(0.171)	 (0.186)	 (0.271)	Specific	Case	 0.208**	 0.216***	 0.229**	(0.087)	 (0.066)	 (0.101)	Age	 0.013***	 0.005	 0.016***	(0.003)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	Female	 0.309***	 -0.018	 -0.082	(0.080)	 (0.061)	 (0.094)	Education	 0.081***	 -0.048	 -0.024	(0.031)	 (0.032)	 (0.038)	Income	Quintile	 0.077**	 -0.011	 0.026	(0.038)	 (0.031)	 (0.044)	International	News	 0.038**	 -0.007	 0.023	(0.016)	 (0.014)	 (0.019)	Religion	 0.189	 -0.041	 0.072	(0.118)	 (0.066)	 (.096)	Religiosity	 -0.169	 0.074	 0.753***	(0.117)	 (0.156)	 (0.239)	Democracy	X	UN	Approval	 0.103	 0.018	 0.224	(0.154)	 (0.117)	 (0.177)	Constant	 -1.516***	 -0.898***	 -1.573***	(0.265)	 (0.276)	 (0.349)	Observations	 3,282	 5,431	 2,303	Akaike	Inf.	Crit.	 4,015.057	 6,811.196	 2,955.631	Source:	Prepared	by	the	authors	with	their	own	data.	Note:	*p<0.1;	**p<0.05;	***p<0.01.		
______________________________________________________________________________________________	13See	 Appendix	 for	more	 information	 about	 each	 sample's	 summary	 statistics	 (Table	 S06,	 Table	S07,	Table	S08).	
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In	both	countries,	self-reported	levels	of	militarism,	internationalism,	and	nationalism	had	a	sizable	effect	on	the	likelihood	of	a	respondent	advocating	the	use	of	force.	 Not	 surprisingly,	 a	 respondent	 with	 strong	 militaristic	 attitudes	 is	 more	likely	to	support	military	action	than	are	less	militaristic	individuals.	Nationalistic	respondents	in	both	countries	tend	to	be	more	favorable	toward	to	the	use	of	force	than	 less	nationalistic	 respondents.	Higher	 levels	of	 these	 two	variables	 in	China	may	 explain	 the	 greater	 overall	 willingness	 of	 Chinese	 respondents	 to	 use	force.	Those	who	thought	of	specific	cases	in	response	to	the	vignettes	were	also	more	 likely	 to	 favor	 aggressive	 foreign	 policy	 action,	 which	 may	 explain	 the	relatively	smaller	effect	sizes	in	studies	with	hypothetical	situations	than	in	studies	that	rely	on	real	cases14.	Perhaps	the	most	striking	distinction	between	the	two	samples	occurs	 in	the	context	of	the	internationalism	measure,	which	produced	large,	significant	but	contrasting	 effects	 for	 Brazil	 and	 China.	 Internationalism	 substantially	 increases	support	 for	 using	 force	 among	 Brazilian	 subjects	 of	 the	 survey	 experiment,	whereas	 it	 is	 negatively	 associated	 with	 a	 willingness	 to	 war	 among	 Chinese	subjects.	We	speculate	that	this	difference	reflects	contrasts	in	how	subjects	in	the	two	countries	interpret	the	role	of	the	United	Nations.	China's	permanent	seat	on	the	 UN	 Security	 Council	 may	 alter	 the	 meaning	 of	 UN	 authorization	 for	 some	Chinese,	as	UN	authorization	requires,	at	a	minimum,	China's	acquiescence.	Figure	01	shows	the	mean	predicted	probability	of	an	average	respondent	from	each	sample	supporting	 the	use	of	 force	 in	each	country,	 contingent	on	 the	target's	 regime	 type	and	UN	approval15.	Attitudinal	variables,	 such	as	militarism,	internationalism,	 nationalism,	 were	 held	 at	 their	 means	 and	 other	 control	variables	at	their	medians	of	each	country.	______________________________________________________________________________________________	14For	our	large	two	samples,	we	checked	for	heterogenous	treatment	effects	due	to	compliance	by	testing	our	models	on	 those	who	 followed	our	 instructions	 to	 think	of	a	generic	case	and	 those	who	admitted	to	thinking	of	specific	cases.	The	results	were	largely	similar,	and	the	direction	of	the	treatments'	effects	were	consistent	across	the	four	subsamples.	Including	a	model	with	interaction	terms	 for	 the	 two	 treatments	 and	 a	 variable	 for	 specific	 cases	 also	 showed	 that	 there	were	 no	interaction	effects	between	the	two	treatments	and	specific	cases	at	the	0.05	level.	The	appendix	includes	 Table	 S09	 listing	 the	 ten	 countries	most	 often	 listed	 by	 subjects	who	 admitted	 they	were	thinking	of	a	specific	country,	rather	than	a	generic	one	as	instructed. 15Note	 that	 scholars	 have	 criticized	 the	 use	 of	 regression	 and	 logistic	 regression	 to	 analyze	experimental	 data	 and	 proposed	 adjustments	 and	 alternatives	 for	 examining	 predicted	 values.	 We	separately	calculated	Freedman's	2008	plug-in	estimator	and	obtained	very	similar	results.	
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Figure	01.	Predicted	probabilities	of	an	average	respondent	supporting	the	use	of	force	
	Source:	Prepared	by	the	authors	with	their	own	data. 	The	predicted	probabilities	generated	reveal	how	these	citizens	react	to	the	target	 country's	 regime	 type	and	 IO	endorsement.	Again,	 the	 rallying	effect	of	UN	approval	 is	 clear	 whereas	 the	 pacific	 effect	 of	 democracy	 is	 weaker.	 Given	 UN	approval,	the	predicted	probability	of	the	Brazilian	respondent	advocating	the	use	of	 force	 against	 a	 non-democratic	 nuclear	 proliferator	 is	 0.43	 and	 against	 a	democratic	proliferator	is	0.37.	Without	UN	approval,	however,	the	probability	of	supporting	war	decreases	to	0.28	when	the	target	is	a	non-democratic	regime	and	further	to	0.21	when	the	target	is	a	democracy.	Similarly,	the	predicted	probability	that	a	Chinese	subject	in	our	first	sample	backs	military	action	sanctioned	by	the	UN	 is	 0.57	 against	 a	 non-democratic	 target	 and	 0.53	 against	 a	 democratic	target.	Without	authorization	by	 the	United	Nations,	 the	 likelihood	 that	Chinese	respondents	support	an	attack	 is	0.47	 if	 the	target	regime	 is	non-democratic	and	0.43	 if	 the	 target	 is	 said	 to	be	 a	democracy.	 In	our	 follow-up	 study	 in	China,	 the	predicted	 probability	 that	 a	 Chinese	 subject	 supports	 an	 UN	 approved	 attack	 is	about	 0.58	 regardless	 of	 the	 target's	 regime	 type.	 Without	 UN	 approval,	 the	predicted	 probability	 is	 0.45	 against	 a	 non-democratic	 target	 and	 0.39	 against	 a	democracy.	
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Of	course,	 the	average	respondent	does	not	represent	 the	average	citizen.	For	this	 reason,	 we	 also	 generated	 predicted	 values	 using	 population	 medians	 and	percentages	 for	age	group,	education	and	gender	 (not	 shown)	 (Minnesota	 Population	Center,	201716).	The	comparative	patterns	were	 identical	as	were	 the	hypothesis	tests.	 The	 only	 difference	 was	 that	 in	 every	 cell	 the	 predicted	 probability	 of	support	 for	 using	 force	was	 about	0.05	higher	 for	 the	population	mean	 than	 for	 the	sample	mean.	This	was	 true	 for	both	Brazil	 and	China,	 reflecting	greater	 support	for	the	use	of	force	among	poorer	and	less	educated	subjects.	As	an	alternative	robustness	check,	we	examine	the	effect	of	the	treatment	as	a	function	of	each	of	the	control	variables	in	our	Appendix.	The	analysis	result	for	 Brazil,	 shows	 how	 strong	 and	 consistent	 the	 effect	 of	 democracy	 is	 on	 the	expressed	 support	 for	 Country	 A's	 use	 of	 force.	 Of	 the	 29	 reported	 treatment	effects	of	regime	type,	28	are	negative	-	meaning	that	democracy	reduced	support	for	Country	A's	use	of	force.	Further,	23	of	the	29	are	statistically	significant,	and	those	that	are	not	tend	to	have	small	samples	and	low	power.	The	results	are	weaker	for	China.	Of	the	29	estimated	effects,	26	are	again	negative,	 and	 the	positive	 values	 tend	 to	have	very	 small	 sample	 sizes	—	 in	one	case,	 just	 11	 subjects17!	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 only	 09	 of	 the	 29	 are	 significantly	different	from	zero.	This	may	reflect	real	variation	within	the	population,	or	it	may	just	 reflect	 lower	 power	 given	 the	 slightly	 smaller	 effect	 of	 democracy	 in	 China.	Our	study	does	not	provide	the	power	needed	to	explore	all	these	differences,	but	several	are	intriguing	and	worth	mentioning.	The	lowest	education	cohort	actually	had	 a	 positive	 treatment	 effect	 -	 they	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 support	 attacking	 a	democratic	Country	B.	The	 impact	of	democracy	was	very	 large	for	subjects	with	low	nationalism,	but	again,	the	sample	size	in	this	category	is	very	small.	We	 also	 estimated	 the	 treatment	 effects	 using	 randomization	 inference	(RIGDON	and	HUDGENS,	2015)18.	The	results	do	not	change	substantially.	Among	our	 Brazilian	 sample,	 the	 average	 treatment	 effect	 (ATE)	 based	 on	______________________________________________________________________________________________	16The	authors	wish	to	acknowledge	the	statistical	offices	that	provided	the	underlying	data	making	this	 research	 possible:	 Institute	 of	 Geography	 and	 Statistics,	 Brazil	 and	 National	 Bureau	 of	Statistics,	China.	17Only	11	Chinese	subjects	in	Sample	1	scored	'Weak'	on	the	Internationalism	index.	18The	effects	were	estimated	using	the	R	package	RI2by2.	
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attributable	 effects	was	 estimated	 as	 -7.7	 percent	 for	 our	 democracy	 treatment	with	 the	 confidence	 interval	 from	 -11	 to	 -4.4	 percent19.	 Among	 our	 Chinese	samples,	the	ATE	based	on	attributable	effects	was	-2.7	percent	(Sample	01)	and	-2.8	 percent	 (YouGov	 sample)	 for	 our	 democracy	 treatment.	 The	 confidence	interval	for	the	effect	was	from	-5.6	to	0.1	percent	for	the	former	and	from	-7.2	to	1.6	percent	for	the	latter20.	
	
Discussion	This	 study	 provides	 evidence	 of	 democracy's	 pacifist	 but	 limited	 effect	among	respondents	from	Brazil	and	China.	Respondents	from	Brazil,	a	democracy,	are	less	supportive	of	the	use	of	force	against	another	democracy,	but	respondents	from	 China,	 a	 non-democratic	 country,	 do	 not	 distinguish	 between	 regime	 type.	Apparently,	 the	willingness	 to	 fight	 a	 democracy	 is	 highly	 context	 dependent.	 In	addition,	 our	 study	 suggests	 an	 existence	 of	 a	 large	 signaling	 effect	 of	 IO	endorsements	 on	 public	 opinion.	 Respondents	 were	 extremely	 sensitive	 to	 the	cues	 from	 international	 organizations	 —more	 than	 the	 cues	 about	 the	potential	 target	country	 itself.	 In	 other	words,	 respondents	 from	Brazil	 and	China	 are	 more	 supportive	 of	 attacking	 a	 democracy	 if	 an	 international	organization	approves	the	attack.	Our	 findings	 show	 that	 Tomz	 and	 Weeks'	 (2013)	 work	 on	 the	 United	States	 and	 United	 Kingdom	 do	 not	 neatly	 generalize	 to	 all	 countries,	 with	important	differences	 in	 the	 impact	of	democracy	on	the	willingness	to	use	 force	when	 comparing	 Brazil	 and	 China.	 One	 possible	 interpretation	 is	 that	 our	findings	 provide	 evidence	 in	 support	 of	 a	 democratic	 peace	 -	 respondents	 in	democratic	Brazil	were	 less	supportive	of	using	 force	against	another	democracy	than	 against	 an	 autocracy;	 respondents	 in	 authoritarian	 China	 made	 no	 such	distinction.	 However,	 a	 major	 limitation	 of	 the	 study	 is	 that,	 since	 we	 only	examined	two	countries,	we	cannot	say	decisively	that	the	differences	in	treatment	effects	between	China	and	Brazil	are	driven	only	by	those	countries'	regime	types	______________________________________________________________________________________________	19The	estimated	effect	for	the	UN	approval	treatment	was	14.2	percent	with	the	confidence	interval	from	10.9	to	17.4	percent.	20The	 effect	 for	 the	 UN	 treatment	 was	 estimated	 as	 8.2	 percent	 (Sample	 01)	 and	 12.1	 percent	(YouGov	Sample).	Their	confidence	intervals	were	from	5.3	to	11.2	percent	and	from	7.7	to	16.5	percent.	
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or	 that	 these	 findings	 generalize	 more	 broadly	 to	 other	 democracies	 or	authoritarian	 regimes.	 Each	 country	 is	 situated	 in	 a	 very	 different	 security	context	which	 could	explain	 its	perspectives	on	the	use	of	force.	We	attempted	to	 partially	 address	 these	 challenges	 by	 decontextualizing	 our	 experimental	vignette	to	use	generic	situations	rather	than	a	threat	facing	our	respondents'	own	countries.	Further,	when	 testing	 for	heterogeneity	 in	 treatment	effects	and	when	respondents	 reported	 thinking	 of	 one	 context	 or	 another,	we	 failed	 to	 reject	 the	null	 of	 no	 heterogeneity,	 suggesting	 that	 our	 decontextualized	 vignette	 was	effective.	Even	so,	there	are	many	other	differences	between	these	cases,	including	economic,	historical,	and	even	cultural,	that	could	explain	away	our	results.	At	the	same	time,	although	our	ability	to	generalize	is	limited,	Brazil	and	China	are	both	leading	 countries	demographically,	militarily,	 and	economically,	 and	as	 such,	 our	finding	 that	 support	 for	 a	 democratic	 peace	 is	 stronger	 in	 Brazil	 than	 in	 China	remains	important.	Our	 study	 is	 also	 limited	 by	 our	 sampling	 method.	 Like	 other	 scholars	working	 in	 this	 area,	 we	 rely	 on	 an	 internet-based	 survey	 drawn	 from	 a	commercial	panel,	not	random	samples21.	For	 the	Chinese	case,	we	validated	our	results	 with	 a	 second	 survey	 that	 over-sampled	 respondents	 with	 low-levels	 of	education.	 Ultimately,	 however,	 scholars	 studying	 the	 public	 opinion	 of	 a	 non-democratic	 country	 face	 a	 conundrum.	 They	 can	 strive	 to	 recruit	 a	 nationally	representative	sample	characteristic	of	 'the	median	voter'.	However,	 it	 is	unclear	whether	 a	 median	 voter	 is	 a	 meaningful	 political	 entity	 in	 a	 society	 lacking	universal	 suffrage.	 An	 ideal	 sample	 of	 respondents	 for	 a	 non-democracy	 may	consist	 of	 elites,	 individuals	 who	 more	 nearly	 reflect	 a	 'pivotal'	 opinion	 in	 the	society.	Researchers	may	need	to	make	a	choice	between	the	median	voter	sample	and	 the	 pivotal	 voter	 sample,	 facing	 questions	 and	 concerns	 in	 each	 case	 about	what	 'representative'	 means	 in	 a	 polity	 that	 lacks	 representation.	 We	 chose	 to	______________________________________________________________________________________________	21Public	opinion	researchers	debate	the	use	of	non-random	samples	and	survey	mode	differences.	Many	are	 skeptical	 about	opt-in	 Internet	 surveys	 and	 strongly	prefer	 face-to-face	 interviews	or	telephone	surveys	with	randomly	selected	samples.	Some	(e.g.	MALHOTRA	and	KROSNICK,	2007)	find	 substantial	 differences	 between	 telephone	 surveys	 with	 random-digit	 dialing	 or	 internet	surveys.	 Others	 (e.g.	 ANSOLABEHERE	 and	 SCHAFFNER,	 2014)	 find	 that	 opt-in	 web	 surveys,	telephone	 surveys,	 and	 mail	 surveys	 with	 identical	 questions	 produce	 similar	 results	 after	weighting	or	matching.	
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pursue	 both	 options,	 collecting	 and	 analyzing	 data	 from	 a	 more	 representative	sample	 of	 the	 Chinese	 population	 through	 YouGov,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 initial	samples.	The	results	from	both	samples	are	largely	consistent.	These	 limitations	 suggest	 directions	 for	 future	 research.	 An	 important	next	step	would	be	to	extend	this	research	to	a	larger	sample	of	countries,	ideally	with	 fully	 representative	 simple	 random	 samples.	 In	 addition,	 future	 work	should	 also	 further	 dissect	 and	 explore	 the	meaning	 of	 democracy	 for	 research	subjects.	 The	 limited	 popularity	 of	 democracy	 in	 China	 might	 well	 derive	 from	different	 factors	 than	those	 that	provide	 its	appeal	 in	Brazil	or	 the	United	States,	though	we	were	unable	to	find	any	indications	of	this	in	the	current	research	design.	 It	 remains	 possible	 that	 'democracy'	 means	 different	 things	 in	different	 places.	Perhaps	democratic	 citizens	may	correctly	perceive	democracy	while	the	subjects	of	nondemocratic	regimes	may	mis-interpret	the	label.	Perhaps,	too,	 'democracy'	 means	 something	 subjective	 in	 both	 democracies	 and	 non-democracies.	While	our	discovery	of	the	'democratic'	nature	of	popular	preferences	for	peace	with	democracies	is	important,	we	find	an	even	larger	effect	of	UN	approval	on	individuals'	support	for	the	use	of	force.	Our	effort	here	has	focused	on	the	role	 of	 democracy	 and	 thus	we	 have	 devoted	 less	 attention	 to	 the	 effects	 of	 UN	approval.	Nonetheless,	 the	strong	experimental	performance	of	UN	authorization	and	its	close	relationship	to	concepts	of	liberal	peace	calls	for	further	investigation.		 Revised	by	Fraser	Robinson	Submitted	on	November	14,	2018	Accepted	on	June	04,	2019	
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Appendix		
Table	S05.	Detailed	recruitment	statistics		 Brazil	 China	(Sample	01)	Field	dates	 08/21/2013	-	09/17/2013	 08/22/2013-	09/12/2013	Number	of	invitations	to	take	the	survey	 7,820	 38,568	Consented	to	take	the	survey	(raw	N)	 4,489	 5,797	Eliminated	due	to	age	 08	 08	Eliminated	due	to	repeat	responses	 0	 0	Complete	entries	 3,282	 5,431	Partial	entries	 932	 313	Overall	N	(complete/partial	entries)	 4,214	 5,744	Median	completion	time	(min)	 06	 04	Source:	Prepared	by	the	authors	with	their	own	data.	Note:	Overall	N	is	the	sum	of	complete	and	partially	complete	entries.	Our	survey	included	a	feature	to	prevent	respondents	 from	 taking	 the	 survey	multiple	 times	by	placing	a	 cookie	on	 their	browser.	Some	 respondents	had	 the	 same	 IP	 addresses,	 presumably	 sharing	 the	 device	 on	which	 they	 took	 the	survey,	as	 in	 the	case	of	members	of	the	same	household	participating	in	the	survey.	We	wanted	to	allow	this	possibility	and	drop	only	those	 respondents	 who	 got	 the	 same	 treatments	 and	 produced	 same	 responses	 repeatedly	 from	 one	 IP	address.	
	 For	Sample	02,	YouGov	created	a	sampling	frame	representative	of	Internet	Users	in	China	based	on	gender,	age,	educational	attainment,	and	income	using	the	annual	 report	by	the	China	 Internet	Network	 Information	Center	 (2014).	YouGov	then	 recruited	a	 total	 of	2,723	 respondents	 and	matched	 those	 respondents	 to	 a	sampling	target	of	2,500	based	on	gender,	age,	and	income.		
Table	S06.	Summary	statistics	(Brazil	Sample)	Statistic	 N	 Mean	 St.	Dev.	 Min	 Pctl	(25)	 Pctl	(75)	 Max	CoW	Country	Code	 4,214	 140.000	 0.000	 140	 140	 140	 140	Support	for	Attack	 4,212	 0.359	 0.480	 0.000	 0.000	 1.000	 1.000	Vignette	 4,214	 2.494	 1.110	 01	 02	 03	 04	Democracy	Treatment	 4,214	 0.501	 0.500	 0	 0	 01	 01	UN	Treatment	 4,214	 0.504	 0.500	 0	 0	 01	 01	Militarism	 4,181	 0.258	 0.302	 0.000	 0.000	 0.500	 1.000	Internationalism	 4,166	 0.599	 0.176	 0.000	 0.500	 0.750	 1.000	Nationalism	 4,182	 0.411	 0.228	 0.000	 0.250	 0.500	 1.000	Specific	Case	 4,165	 0.260	 0.439	 0.000	 0.000	 1.000	 1.000	Age	 4,214	 36.112	 12.564	 18	 25	 46	 79	Female	 4,190	 0.519	 0.500	 0.000	 0.000	 1.000	 1.000	Education	 4,204	 4.387	 1.373	 1.000	 3.000	 5.000	 7.000	Income	 3,753	 3.890	 1.146	 1.000	 3.000	 5.000	 5.000	Read	International	News	(Days	Per	Week)	 4,203	 4.059	 2.548	 0.000	 2.000	 7.000	 7.000	Is	Religious	 3,955	 0.856	 0.351	 0.000	 1.000	 1.000	 1.000	Religiosity	 3,954	 0.338	 0.352	 0.000	 0.000	 0.500	 1.000	Source:	Prepared	by	the	authors	with	their	own	data.	
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Table	S07.	Summary	statistics	(China	Sample	01)	Statistic	 N	 Mean	 St.	Dev.	 Min	 Pctl	(25)	 Pctl	(75)	 Max	CoW	Country	Code	 5,744	 710.000	 0.000	 710	 710	 710	 710	Support	for	Attack	 5,743	 0.515	 0.500	 0.000	 0.000	 1.000	1.000	Vignette	 5,744	 2.530	 1.121	 01	 02	 04	 04	Democracy	Treatment	 5,744	 0.486	 0.500	 0	 0	 01	 01	UN	Treatment	 5,744	 0.497	 0.500	 0	 0	 01	 01	Militarism	 5,662	 0.511	 0.403	 0.000	 0.000	 1.000	1.000	Internationalism	 5,682	 0.719	 0.129	 0.125	 0.625	 0.812	1.000	Nationalism	 5,680	 0.744	 0.165	 0.000	 0.625	 0.875	1.000	Specific	Case	 5,730	 0.281	 0.449	 0.000	 0.000	 1.000	1.000	Age	 5,744	 31.375	 8.331	 18	 25	 36	 82	Female	 5,696	 0.435	 0.496	 0.000	 0.000	 1.000	1.000	Education	 5,725	 4.758	 0.984	 1.000	 5.000	 5.000	7.000	Income	 5,723	 3.788	 1.027	 1.000	 3.000	 5.000	5.000	Read	International	News	(Days	Per	Week)	 5,731	 4.552	 2.319	 0.000	 3.000	 7.000	7.000	Is	Religious	 5,732	 0.433	 0.496	 0.000	 0.000	 1.000	1.000	Religiosity	 5,720	 0.098	 0.215	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	1.000	Source:	Prepared	by	the	authors	with	their	own	data.	
	
	
Table	S08.	Summary	statistics	(China	Sample	02)	Statistic	 N	 Mean	 St.	Dev.	 Min	 Pctl	(25)	 Pctl	(75)	 Max	CoW	Country	Code	 2,500	 710.000	 0.000	 710	 710	 710	 710	Support	for	Attack	 2,496	 0.524	 0.500	 0.000	 0.000	 1.000	 1.000	Vignette	 2,500	 2.518	 1.121	 01	 02	 04	 04	Democracy	Treatment	 2,500	 0.492	 0.500	 0	 0	 01	 01	UN	Treatment	 2,500	 0.498	 0.500	 0	 0	 01	 01	Militarism	 2,401	 0.460	 0.405	 0.000	 0.000	 1.000	 1.000	Internationalism	 2,456	 0.698	 0.132	 0.000	 0.625	 0.750	 1.000	Nationalism	 2,477	 0.735	 0.174	 0.000	 0.625	 0.875	 1.000	Specific	Case	 2,491	 0.261	 0.439	 0.000	 0.000	 1.000	 1.000	Age	 2,500	 32.288	 10.913	 18	 24	 39	 82	Female	 2,500	 0.424	 0.494	 0	 0	 01	 01	Education	 2,500	 4.123	 1.239	 01	 03	 05	 07	Income	 2,500	 2.072	 1.081	 01	 01	 02	 05	Read	International	News	(Days	Per	Week)	 2,489	 3.472	 2.572	 0.000	 1.000	 7.000	 7.000	Is	Religious	 2,489	 0.448	 0.497	 0.000	 0.000	 1.000	 1.000	Religiosity	 2,480	 0.088	 0.216	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 1.000	Source:Prepared	by	the	authors	with	their	own	data.		
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Table	S09.	Top	ten	countries/regions	mentioned	by	non-complying	respondents	Brazil	 China		 	 	 Sample	01	 Sample	02		 Country/Region	 N	 Country/Region	 N	 Country/Region	 N	01	 Syria	 213	 North	Korea	 725	 Japan	 417		 (18.816%)	 (44.697%)	 (63.373%)	02	 Iran	 151	 Japan	 292	 North	Korea	 63		 (13.339%)	 (18.002%)	 (9.574%)	03	 North	Korea	 151	 US	 258	 US	 47		 (13.339%)	 (15.906%)	 (7.142%)	04	 US	 150	 Syria	 84	 China	 41		 (13.250%)	 (5.178%)	 (6.231%)	05	 Korea	 45	 Iran	 68	 Iran	 07		 (3.975%)	 (4.192%)	 (1.063%)	06	 Brazil	 34	 China	 40	 Russia	 05		 (3.003%)	 (2.466%)	 (0.759%)	07	 Iraq	 25	 South	Korea	 30	 The	Philippines	 05		 (2.208%)	 (1.849%)	 (0.759%)	08	 South	Korea	 22	 India	 12	 Canada	 03		 (1.943%)	 (0.739%)	 (0.455%)	09	 Middle	East	 18	 Iraq	 11	 France	 02		 (1.590%)	 (0.678%)	 (0.303%)	10	 China	 16	 Russia	 4	 UK	 02		 (1.413%)	 (0.246%)	 (0.303%)	Total	N	of	Non-compliers	 1,132	 	 1,622	 	 658	Total	N	of	Compliers	 3,131	 4,136	 1,851	Source:	Prepared	by	the	authors	with	their	own	data.	Note:	The	table	lists	the	ten	countries	mostly	frequently	listed	by	non-complying	respondents	who	admit-	 ted	 they	 were	 thinking	 of	 a	 specific	 country,	 rather	 than	 a	 generic	 one,	 defying	 our	instruction	 to	 think	 of	 the	 latter	 in	 the	 beginning.	 These	 non-compliers	 were	 asked	 to	 list	 the	specific	 countries	 in	 at	 the	end	of	 the	 survey.	We	did	not	 explicitly	 state	 a	 limit	 to	 the	number	of	countries	they	can	list	and	respondents	were	free	to	list	as	many	countries	as	they	can	fit	into	the	blank.	Here	we	show	only	the	first	country	they	listed	in	their	open-ended	response,	analyzing	only	one	observation	per	respondent.		
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Table	S10.	Support	for	an	attack	and	the	effect	of	democracy,	controlling	for	attitudinal	and	demographic	attributes	Brazil	 		 China	(Sample	1)	%	Support	for	Attacking		 %	Support	for	Attacking	 N	 %	Support	for	Attacking	 N	 Effect	of	%	Support	for	Attacking	 N	 	 N	 		 a	Democracy	 	 an	Autocracy	 	 Democracy	 a	Democracy	 	 an	Autocracy	 	 Effect	of	Democracy	Militarism	Weak	 24.543	 1,149	 31.025	 1,112	 -6.482⇤⇤⇤	 30.342	 847	 32.147	 927	 -1.804	Medium	 37.173	 842	 46.707	 835	 -9.533⇤⇤⇤	 46.458	 960	 51.748	 1,030	 -5.289⇤⇤	Strong	 73.585	 106	 72.059	 136	 1.526	 71.789	 950	 74.446	 947	 -2.656	Internationalism	Weak	 27.368	 95	 32.990	 97	 -5.621	 83.333	 6	 80.000	 5	 3.333	Medium	 30.860	 1,442	 38.184	 1,388	 -7.325⇤⇤⇤	 53.198	 1,376	 55.866	 1,432	 -2.668	Strong	 36.479	 551	 45.178	 591	 -8.699⇤⇤⇤	 46.647	 1,387	 49.627	 1,475	 -2.980	Nationalism	Weak	 31.385	 787	 38.996	 777	 -7.611⇤⇤⇤	 41.667	 24	 68.000	 25	 -26.333⇤	Medium	 30.556	 1,044	 39.089	 1,054	 -8.534⇤⇤⇤	 45.358	 851	 47.948	 999	 -2.590	Strong	 39.777	 269	 46.586	 249	 -6.809	 52.331	 1,888	 55.444	 1,892	 -3.113⇤	Manipulation	Check	Generic	Case	 31.052	 1,549	 38.316	 1,532	 -7.264⇤⇤⇤	 48.044	 2,019	 51.284	 2,102	 -3.241⇤⇤	Specific	Case	 35.460	 533	 44.627	 549	 -9.167⇤⇤⇤	 55.642	 771	 56.870	 837	 -1.228	Gender	Female	 28.105	 1,103	 34.641	 1,071	 -6.535⇤⇤⇤	 47.966	 1,180	 50.463	 1,296	 -2.497	Male	 36.710	 997	 45.329	 1,017	 -8.619⇤⇤⇤	 51.387	 1,586	 54.685	 1,633	 -3.297⇤	Education	Less	than	High	School	Diploma	 33.333	 90	 45.000	 80	 -11.667	 54.237	 59	 50	 72	 4.237	High	School	Diploma	 33.031	 551	 39.771	 523	 -6.740⇤⇤	 52.294	 327	 54.913	 346	 -2.620	Some	College	or	College	Degree	 31.943	 1,127	 39.697	 1,121	 -7.753⇤⇤⇤	 50.068	 2,221	 53.189	 2,305	 -3.121⇤⇤	Some	Graduate	School	or	Graduate	Degree	 30.861	 337	 39.142	 373	 -8.282⇤⇤	 46.023	 176	 46.330	 218	 -0.308	Income	1st	and	2nd	Income	Quintiles	 33.113	 302	 38.356	 292	 -5.244	 50.974	 308	 53.151	 365	 -2.177	3rd	Income	Quintile	 29.651	 344	 40.312	 320	 -10.661⇤⇤⇤	 47.331	 712	 54.051	 790	 -6.719⇤⇤⇤	4th	Income	Quintile	 33.261	 460	 37.427	 513	 -4.166	 51.844	 922	 52.741	 912	 -0.897	5th	Income	Quintile	 33.207	 789	 42.955	 731	 -9.748⇤⇤⇤	 50.000	 840	 52.005	 873	 -2.005	
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International	News	Read	Int’l	News	0-2	Days/Week	 32.349	 711	 35.972	 720	 -3.623	 48.632	 658	 54.306	 720	 -5.673⇤⇤	Read	Int’l	News	3-5	Days/Week	 31.448	 601	 39.932	 591	 -8.485⇤⇤⇤	 51.875	 960	 53.854	 1,025	 -1.979	Read	Int’l	News	Everyday	 32.197	 792	 43.384	 786	 -11.187⇤⇤⇤	 49.360	 1,171	 51.421	 1,196	 -2.062	Religion	Religious	 32.572	 1,707	 40.573	 1,676	 -8.001⇤⇤⇤	 50.161	 1,242	 51.290	 1,240	 -1.129	No	Religion	 32.331	 266	 35.855	 304	 -3.524	 50.000	 1,546	 53.905	 1,703	 -3.905⇤⇤	Religiosity	Weak	 33.933	 834	 40.247	 810	 -6.314⇤⇤⇤	 49.071	 2154	 53.489	 2,307	 -4.418⇤⇤⇤	Medium	 32.551	 682	 40.565	 673	 -8.013⇤⇤⇤	 53.346	 523	 50.000	 484	 3.346	Strong	 28.821	 458	 39.394	 495	 -10.573⇤⇤⇤	 52.381	 105	 52.740	 146	 -0.359	Source:	Prepared	by	the	authors	with	their	own	data.	Note:	The	table	displays	the	percentage	of	respondents	who	supported	military	action	against	a	non-democratic	target	and	the	effect	of	democracy,	controlling	for	attitudinal	and	demographic	variables.	The	difference	in	the	percentages	is	estimated	as	the	effect	of	democracy.	Asterisks	(***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*p<0.1)	show	the	statistical	significance	of	the	effect.					
